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Chapter Eight

Questions, Questions:
Has Weber Had an Impact on Unions’
Representational Responsibilities in
Workplace Human Rights Disputes?
Claire Mummé

INTRODUCTION
Union representation in Canada is premised on strength in numbers — the collective makes each member stronger. But collective representation, by its nature, can also produce tension between collective
and individual rights and interests. A recurring theme of Bernie Adell’s
scholarship was a concern for how best to balance this tension.1 He was,
in particular, critical of the union’s veto over access to labour arbitration,
*

1

My sincere thanks to the organizers and participants in the CLCW’s Weber Conference for a great few days of conversation, and useful comments on this essay.
Thanks in particular to anonymous reviewers for some very helpful nuances, to
Renée-Claude Drouin for providing me with a better sense of the legal context in
Quebec, to Aaron Bhogossian and Tori-Lee Jenkins for helpful research assistance,
and to Elizabeth Shilton for her ongoing support and intellectual engagement.
BL Adell, “The Duty of Fair Representation — Effective Protection for Individual
Rights in Collective Agreements?” (1970) 25:3 Relations industrielles/Industrial
Relations 602; Bernard Adell, “Collective Agreements and Individual Rights: A
Note on the Duty of Fair Representation” (1986) 11:2 Queen’s Law Journal 251 [Adell,
“Collective Agreements”]; Bernard Adell, “Jurisdictional Overlap Between Arbitration and Other Forums: An Update” (2000) 8 Canadian Labour and Employment
Law Journal 179 [Adell, “Jurisdictional Overlap”]; Bernard Adell, “The Duty of Fair
Representation: ‘a form of words . . .’?,” (PowerPoint delivered at Adjudicating Human Rights in the Workplace After the Pinto Report, Where Do We Go Next?, CLCW
Workshop, Queen’s University, 10 November 2012)) [unpublished].
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suggesting in 1985 that the veto provided unions with too much power
over important personal rights.2 For this reason, he suggested, members
ought to have the right to bring forward a grievance to arbitration at their
own cost if the union refused to do so. Adell reiterated that concern after
the Supreme Court of Canada’s 1995 decision in Weber which, he thought,
served to compound the tensions unions must manage between individual and collective rights.3
There has been much commentary on Weber, and on the Supreme
Court’s subsequent 2004 decision in Parry Sound (District) Welfare Administration Board v Ontario Public Service Employees Union Local 324.4
Concerns raised include the impact of these decisions on the institution
of labour arbitration, the more general implications of merging legal regimes focused on individual rights into a system premised on collective
representation, the potential for diminution of the individual rights of
unionized employees, and the costs to unions associated with expanded
arbitral jurisdiction.5 Human rights issues have been at the centre of
2
3
4
5

Adell, “Collective Agreements” at 255–58.
Adell, “Jurisdictional Overlap,” above note 1 at 224–29; Weber v Ontario Hydro [1995]
2 SCR 929 [Weber].
2003 SCC 42 [Parry Sound].
Some of these issues are discussed in other chapters in this volume. See also Ronald
Pink & DC Wallbridge, “The Future of Labour Arbitration” (Paper delivered at The
2010 Administrative, Labour and Employment and Privacy and Access Conference,
Ottawa, 26–27 November 2010) (2010) Canadian Bar Association; Fay Faraday,
“The Expanding Scope of Arbitration: Mainstreaming Human Rights Values and
Remedies” (2005) 12 Canadian Labour and Employment Law Journal 355; Andrew
K Lokan & Maryth Yachnin, “From Weber to Parry Sound: The Expanded Scope of
Arbitration” (2004) 11 Canadian Labour and Employment Law Journal 1; John-Paul
Alexandrowicz, “Restoring the Role of Grievance Arbitration: A New Approach to
Weber” (2003) 10 Canadian Labour and Employment Law Journal 269; Adell, “Jurisdictional Overlap,” above note 1; Richard MacDowell, “Labour Arbitration — The
New Labour Court?” (2000) 8 Canadian Labour and Employment Law Journal 121;
Brian Etherington, “Promises, Promises: Notes on Diversity and Access to Justice”
(2000) 26:1 Queen’s Law Journal 43; Donald Carter, “Looking at Weber Five Years
Later: Is it Time for a New Approach?” (2000) 8 Canadian Labour and Employment
Law Journal 231; Michel G Picher, “Defining the Scope of Arbitration: The Impact of
Weber: An Arbitrator’s Perspective” in Kevin Whitaker et al, eds, (1999–2000) 1 Labour Arbitration Year Book (Toronto: Lancaster House, 2000) 99; Raymond Brown
& Brian Etherington. “Weber v Ontario Hydro: A Denial of Access to Justice for the
Organized Employee” (1996) 4 Canadian Labour and Employment Law Journal 183.
For a defence of exclusive arbitral jurisdiction, see Peter Gall, Andrea Zwack and
Katie Bayne, “Determining Human Rights Issues in the Unionized Workplace: The
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much of both the debate and the jurisprudence concerning expanded
arbitral jurisdiction. But one problem that has received less attention is
the impact of Weber and Parry Sound on the nature and extent of unions’
human rights representational obligations in the administration of the
collective bargaining agreement.6 Examining how unions are handling
their representational role in regards to members’ human rights requires,
for the most part, answering a series of empirical questions — questions
that are not easily resolved through a study of caselaw.
This essay attempts to put forward a research agenda for properly
evaluating the changing nature of unions’ human rights representational
obligations since Weber. I begin by investigating two legal questions: first,
whether unions are held to a more stringent duty of fair representation
(DFR) standard in regards to members’ discrimination grievances than
prior to Weber and Parry Sound, and second, whether there has been a
broadening of the concept of union discrimination under human rights
codes, such that unions may be held liable for failing to bring forward
discrimination grievances. With the legal picture in place, I then set out a
series of empirical questions that need further research to properly assess
whether, and to what extent, Weber and Parry Sound have altered unions’
human rights obligations in the administration of collective agreements,
and more generally, their approaches to dealing with human rights issues
in the workplace. The essay intentionally raises more questions than it
answers, with the objective of provoking further research on important
issues regarding labour law in action.

6

Case for Exclusive Jurisdiction” (2005) 12 Canadian Labour and Employment Law
Journal 381.
For one notable exception, see Yves-Christian Ménard, La discrimination en milieu
de travail et le devoir juridique de représentation syndicale: une analyse socio-juridique (LLM Thesis, Université de Montréal Faculté des études supiérieures, 2011)
[unpublished]. See also Elizabeth Shilton, “ ‘Everybody’s Business’: Human Rights
Enforcement and the Union’s Duty to Accommodate” (2014) 18:1 Canadian Labour
and Employment Law Journal 209, which touches upon unions’ human rights responsibilities in the negotiation of collective agreements, an issue I do not examine here.
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A. THE IMPACT OF WEBER AND PARRY SOUND ON THE BALANCE
BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE RIGHTS OF
UNIONIZED WORKERS
The details of the SCC’s decisions in Weber and Parry Sound are addressed
elsewhere in this volume,7 and will not be repeated here. Much of the early discussion on the significance of Weber focused on the practical strains
placed on unions and on the labour arbitration process by the expansion
of exclusive arbitral jurisdiction.8 The concerns triggered by Weber were
magnified after the SCC’s decision in Parry Sound, which, for a time at
least, seemed to significantly expand arbitrators’ exclusive jurisdiction
as regards statutory employment rights, and in particular human rights
claims.9
Weber and Parry Sound provided clear benefits to employers. Expanded
exclusive arbitral jurisdiction reduced the number of fora in which an
employer could be sued. And because the principle of exclusivity endows
unions with control over access to labour arbitration, the employer could
now deal with only one party (the union) to negotiate settlements over a
broader swath of legal claims. Moreover, the union would likely exercise
a disciplining force in deciding which grievances were brought forward,
thereby reducing the number of weak and frivolous claims faced by the
employer.
For employees, Weber was a mixed bag. On the one hand, a single decision-maker could now resolve most of their work-related claims. Moreover,
workers would now have the benefit of union representation and cost-free
7
8
9

See e.g., Brian Etherington, “Weber, and Almost Everything After, 20 Years Later: Its
Impact on Individual Charter, Common Law and Statutory Rights Claims,” Chapter 2.
See sources above note 5.
The outcome in Parry Sound itself can be explained relatively uncontroversially
as a simple application of s 48(12)(j) of the Ontario Labour Relations Act, 1995, SO
1995, c 1, Schedule A [OLRA], which grants arbitrators the power “to interpret and
apply human rights and other employment-related statutes, despite any conflict between those statutes and the terms of the collective agreement.” But the Court went
farther to hold that statutory human rights obligations are effectively incorporated
as terms of the collective agreement. Combined with the Supreme Court’s expansive understanding in Weber of what constitutes matters that “in their essential
character, arise from the interpretation, application, administration or violation of
the collective agreement” (Weber, above note 3 at para 57), Parry Sound appeared
to significantly increase the scope of exclusive arbitral jurisdiction over employment-related statutes that had previously been enforceable in other forums.
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(at least to individuals) legal proceedings rather than paying for the costs
of legal action and legal representation themselves. They would also have
the strength of the collective at their backs. On the other hand, because the
union decides which grievances to bring forward to arbitration, unionized
employees would now not have carriage over important individual rights
claims, with the potential that those claims would not be resolved at all. For
commentators such as Adell, this last concern was particularly acute as
regards workplace discrimination issues.
The impact of Weber on unions differed depending on their size and
individual histories. Long before Weber and Parry Sound, some unions
had bargained human rights provisions into their collective agreements.
And it was clear since McLeod v Egan10 that employment-related statutes
could be applied at arbitration to the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements, a principle further solidified in Ontario by the addition of section 48(12)(j) to the Labour Relations Act in 1995.11 What Weber
and Parry Sound changed was the scope of what would be considered a
matter arising out of a collective bargaining agreement, and therefore
subject to exclusive arbitral jurisdiction. This mattered, amongst other
reasons, because the twin principles of majoritarianism and exclusivity
serve to appoint unions as the exclusive representative of the bargaining
unit, with control over access to the grievance process and arbitration.12
To the extent that labour arbitration now appeared to be the exclusive
forum for adjudicating an increasing number of members’ individual
rights claims, scholars wondered whether unions would now face heightened scrutiny under the DFR, and thus face pressure to account more
stringently for the ways they determined the appropriate balance between individual and collective interests.13
To be clear, tensions between individual and collective interests were
not new. Collective representation requires managing disparate and
sometimes conflicting interests amongst members. The new question
was whether Weber would serve to heighten such tensions, particularly
10
11
12

(1974), [1975] 1 SCR 517, 46 DLR (3d) 150 [McLeod].
OLRA, above note 9.
How this works is well explained in Judd v Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada Local 2000, [2003] BCLRBD No 63, 2003 CLLC 220-055 [Judd].
13 Bernard Adell, “The Union’s Duty of Fair Representation in Discrimination Cases:
The New Obligation to be Proactive” in Kevin Whitaker et al, eds, (2000–2001) 1
Labour Arbitration Year Book (Toronto: Lancaster House, 2002) 263 at 264 [Adell,
“The Union’s DFR”].
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for smaller, less well-funded unions, by directing an increasing number of
disputes concerning statutory and common law workplace rights to labour
arbitration, access to which was determined by the union. Would the union
now face greater scrutiny in regards to its duty of fair representation when,
for instance, the only way to accommodate a member with a disability
was to disregard the seniority list, thereby displacing the rights of other
members? Would it change the way unions dealt with situations where
one member accused another of discrimination, and the union had to represent the interests of both? And what would be the cost implications of
the expanding zone of member rights to be resolved at labour arbitration?
In an article on Weber penned in 2000, Adell noted:
The increasingly frequent links between anti-discrimination rights, which
are vested in individuals, and the collective agreement administration
process, which privileges collective rights, threaten to put very heavy
pressure on the DFR both in theory and in practice. Those pressures
are further aggravated by the various lines of jurisprudence stemming
from Weber v. Ontario Hydro . . . [T]hat jurisprudence is giving unions
and the grievance arbitration process an as yet ill-defined range of new
responsibilities for enforcing employee rights (and duties) previously
enforced in other forums . . . .14

Weber addressed itself to the jurisdictional relationship between common law courts and statutory tribunals. The issue of competing jurisdiction between statutory tribunals was addressed a few years later in Québec
(Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v Québec
(Procureur général).15 There the majority of the Court modified the Weber
analysis in the context of competing statutory tribunals, holding that it
was first necessary to examine the nature of the jurisdictional grant of authority to each tribunal to determine whether one or other held exclusive
jurisdiction, or whether their jurisdiction was concurrent. If jurisdiction
was concurrent, one should then determine which tribunal was the best
fit in the circumstances. The Morin majority was attracted to this more
flexible approach at least in part from a concern that unions may, in some
circumstances, be opposed in interest to some of their members.16 The
decision implied (although it did not decide) that where the union deter14
15
16

Adell, “Jurisdictional Overlap,” above note 1 at 223.
2004 SCC 39 [Morin].
Ibid at para 28.
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mined that the balance tipped in favour of collective rather than individual interests, a path to adjudication other than labour arbitration should
be available to individual employees.
Two years after Morin, the Supreme Court of Canada held in
Tranchemontagne v Ontario (Director, Disability Support Program) that all
statutory decision-makers endowed with the power to decide questions
of fact and law have the authority to interpret and apply human rights
codes.17 Although Morin still formally controls, after Tranchemontagne 1
most decision-makers no longer engage in the second step of the Morin
analysis, concluding a priori that labour arbitrators and human rights
tribunals share concurrent jurisdiction over the human rights claims of
unionized employees. Instead, most decision-makers focus on attempting to control multiple proceedings before concurrent tribunals through
issue estoppel and res judicata principles.18
One might have thought that the adoption of a concurrency model
would lessen the weight of unions’ representational obligations. In theory,
the concurrency model allows for a unionized employee either to pursue a grievance through the union to arbitration, or to bring her claim
independently to a human rights commission or tribunal. In practice, in
Ontario at least, that choice has been realizable since the abolition of
the Ontario Human Rights Commission’s gatekeeping function, and the
institution of direct access to the Human Rights Tribunal in 2006.19 But
as Elizabeth Shilton has convincingly argued, there are strong pressures
17
18

19

2006 SCC 14 [Tranchemontagne 1].
The Supreme Court issued two recent decisions on the application of issue estoppel in the context of competing statutory tribunals; British Columbia (Workers’
Compensation Board) v Figliola, 2011 SCC 52, and Penner v Niagara (Regional Police
Services Board), 2013 SCC 19. There continues to be uncertainty in the caselaw, and
within the Court, about how to balance the principles of fairness and of finality
when dealing with overlapping tribunal jurisdiction. For a short but interesting
analysis of the relationship between these two decisions, see Paul Daly, “Does
Penner Overrule Figliola? What’s the Canadian Law on Issue Estoppel?” (11 April
2013) Administrative Law Matters (blog), online, www.administrativelawmatters.
com/blog/2013/04/11/does-penner-overrule-figliola-whats-the-canadian-law-on-
issue-estoppel. For an analysis of Figliola’s labour impact see Shilton, above note 6
at 236–239. For a consideration of Figliola from a human rights perspective, see Laverne Jacobs, “Figliola: Competing Jurisdiction, Shared Governance, and Protecting
Human Rights in the Canadian Administrative State,” online: (2013) Social Science
Research Network http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2184585.
Shilton, above note 6 at 234–35; Etherington, above note 5 at 51–62.
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that push unionized employees to arbitration rather than human rights
tribunals.20 In many instances collective bargaining agreements may offer greater rights and protections than human rights codes. For example,
the collective agreement may provide stronger accommodation language
than the undue hardship standard imbedded in the human rights code.
Or the agreement’s “just cause” and progressive discipline requirements
may impose greater obligations on the employer than provided by the
code. Or there may be issues at play in addition to the discrimination
claim which would be resolvable at arbitration, but over which a human
rights tribunal does not have jurisdiction. For a host of reasons, therefore,
it may be more beneficial for a unionized employee to proceed to arbitration than to bring a human rights claim to a tribunal.21 The benefits of
arbitration are attested to by the fact that the number of discrimination
grievances decided by arbitrators does not appear to have diminished
since Morin and Tranchemontagne 1.22 What, then, are the legal principles
that animate unions’ obligations towards their members’ human rights
disputes?

B. UNIONS’ POST-WEBER LEGAL OBLIGATIONS REGARDING
WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION
As already mentioned, it was clear prior to Weber that unions had important human rights obligations in the workplace. Since McLeod, arbitrators
have been required to consider human rights principles in their interpretation of collective bargaining agreements.23 In Ontario, this power was given
explicit statutory support in 1994 with the addition of section 48(12)(j)
of the OLRA.24 And in 1992, in Central Okanagan District School No 23 v
Renaud, the Supreme Court held that in addition to employers, unions
20
21

22

23
24

Shilton, ibid at 235–40.
See Shilton, ibid, for a discussion of a unionized employee’s options and their differing consequences under a system of concurrency between labour arbitration and
human rights tribunals. Of course employees’ decision-making in such instances
is not always well informed, and there is always a risk of making forum choices
without the benefit of a clear sense of the consequences.
Bernie Adell observed at the Inaugural Innis Christie Symposium at Dalhousie
University in 2010 that the 4th Series of the LACs should be known as the “human
rights series.” See Pink & Wallbridge, above note 5 at 5.
McLeod, above note 10.
OLRA, above note 9.
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also owe a duty to accommodate workers in the workplace under human
rights legislation.25 Although it is the employer that is primarily responsible for ensuring a discrimination-free workplace, the Court in Renaud
held that in limited circumstances a union could also be directly liable
for discrimination under human rights codes. This could occur where
the union participated with the employer in negotiating discriminatory
collective bargaining provisions, or where the union impeded employers’
legitimate attempts to accommodate a union member. Finally, through the
duty of fair representation, unions were required to represent all members
in good faith, and in a non-arbitrary and non-discriminatory manner.26
The first question then is whether, since Weber and Parry Sound,
unions have faced greater scrutiny of their duty of fair representation
when deciding not to bring forward, or to settle, a human rights grievance.
The second is whether there has been greater scope for unions’ direct
liability under human rights codes in such situations.

1) The Post-Weber DFR Standard
At the time Weber was decided, the Supreme Court’s most current statements on the DFR were contained in two cases decided in 1990, Gendron v
Supply & Services Union of Public Service Alliance of Canada, Local 50057,27
and Centre hospitalier Régina Ltée v Québec (Tribunal du travail).28 Since
then, the Court has issued only one decision on the DFR, and the principles have remained constant.29
The duty of fair representation acts as a check on the principle of exclusivity. The union’s role as the exclusive representative of the employees
in the bargaining unit endows it with the discretion to determine which
matters to take forward to arbitration, and to determine when and on
what terms to settle disputes with the employer. But that discretion must
be exercised in good faith, without discrimination or arbitrariness. In
Gendron the Court explained that “while the union’s status as exclusive
bargaining agent operates to counteract the economic power of the employer, and therefore works to the benefit of those represented, it was
25
26
27
28
29

[1992] 2 SCR 970, 95 DLR (4th) 577 [Renaud].
OLRA, above note 9, s 74.
[1990] 1 SCR 1298, 21 ACWS (3d) 289 [Gendron]
[1990] 1 SCR 1330, 69 DLR (4th) 609 [Centre Hospitalier].
Noël v Société d’énergie de la Baie James, 2001 SCC 39 [Noel].
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nevertheless necessary to ensure that unions wielded their power fairly.”30
The DFR is therefore a protective legal mechanism afforded to individual
members to hold unions accountable for the ways in which they determine the needs of the collective, and when to pursue matters on behalf of
individual members.
Bad faith arises where there is hostility or animus towards the employee.31 Arbitrariness arises where unions’ decisions are not based on a
thorough study of the facts and the content of the agreement, where the
significance of the grievance and of the consequence for the employee
are not taken into consideration, and/or where serious negligence mars
the decision-making process.32 Discrimination is defined as differential
treatment without a legitimate labour relations purpose; for the purposes of the DFR, discrimination therefore encompasses both grounds
prohibited by human rights statutes and other types of non-justifiable
differential treatment.33 The DFR, however, does not impose a standard
of perfection, or even of reasonableness. The Boards and the courts acknowledge that when they are balancing the interests of many, unions
cannot function with constant scrutiny over every decision. They have
the right to be wrong and to make mistakes, so long as their decisions are
reasoned, not arbitrary, in bad faith or discriminatory.34
The DFR principles have remained relatively unchanged since Rayonier, and the SCC’s approval of the Rayonier principles in Gagnon in 1984.35
Nonetheless, in 2001 Adell identified some decisions suggesting that
labour boards had begun to assess the DFR standard more stringently in
regards to unions’ decisions not to bring forward discrimination grievances. He suggested that there was an increasing jurisprudential move
30
31
32
33
34

35

Gendron, above note 27 at para 28.
Rayonier Canada (BC) Ltd v International Woodworkers of America, Local 1-217,
[1975] BCLRBD no 42, [1975] 2 Can LRBR 196 at paras 15–17 [Rayonier].
Judd, above note 12 at paras 58–70.
Rayonier, above note 31 at para 17.
Ibid at para 24. In Chrysler Canada Ltd, [1999] OLRB Rep July/August 757, [1999]
OLRD No 2454 [Switzer Grievance] the Ontario Labour Relations Board, discussing
the DFR standard, stated, “So long as it acts honestly, objectively and gives due
consideration to matters which fall within the ambit of its responsibility as exclusive bargaining agent, a union will not be held to account if it makes a mistake or a
simple error in judgment. A union has a sort of limited ‘right to be wrong’.” Ibid at
para 21.
Canadian Merchant Service Guild v Gagnon, [1984] 1 SCR 509, 9 DLR (4th) 641.
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towards requiring unions to be more proactive in their representation
when a member raised a human rights issue in the workplace.36
In a number of DFR proceedings in the late 1990s, labour boards suggested that unions may have a duty to be more proactive in their representation of members with psychological disabilities. The first such case,
as Adell noted, was H(K) v Communications, Energy and Paperworkers
Union, Local 1-S,37 a decision issued by the Saskatchewan Labour Relations
Board in 1997. There a grievor was subject to escalating discipline for a
series of incidents that were the product of a depression from which he
suffered. There were serious disagreements between his physician and
that of the employer, which led the employer to request an independent
third examination. The Board noted that while there was no provision in
the collective bargaining agreement requiring a third party examination
in this type of situation, the union had nevertheless agreed to the employer’s request and pushed the grievor to submit despite his doctor’s concerns.
The Board also found problematic the union’s failure to challenge the appropriateness of a progressive discipline framework for dealing with the
grievor’s situation. The Board ultimately concluded that while the union’s
approach might have been acceptable in general, by not taking into account the specific circumstances of the grievor’s disability the union discriminated against him in violation of its duty of fair representation.
The Board’s concern in H(K) was that the union failed to recognize the
effects of the psychological disability on the grievor, and the disability’s relationship both to the alleged misconduct, and to the grievor’s interactions
with the union or employer. In other words, the union’s obligation to be
more proactive in its representation arose because of the nature of the
grievor’s illness, and not because his dispute with the employer involved a
discrimination claim or other “critical job interest.” However, other cases
have applied a duty to be proactive in cases simply on the basis that the
dispute involved a disability.38 Most notably, in 2004 in Bingley v Teamsters, Local 91,39 the Canadian Industrial Relations Board (CIRB) imposed
an obligation on the union to be proactive in a case involving a courier
who suffered from a form of skin cancer, and who sought a reduction in
the hours of her shift as a temporary accommodation to minimize sun
36
37
38
39

Adell, “The Union’s DFR,” above note 13.
[1997] Sask LRBR 476, 98 CCLC 220-020 [H(K)].
Haggith v Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 401, [2001] BCLRBD No 273,
[2001] LVI 3212-6 [Haggith].
[2004] CIRB No 291, [2004] CIRBD No 32 [Bingley].
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exposure. When she was denied the accommodation, her union filed a
grievance that was ultimately resolved prior to arbitration. Bingley thereafter sought to bring a second grievance to secure back pay for wages lost
during the period without accommodation. The union refused to bring
forward the second grievance, and she brought a DFR claim against the
union.
The CIRB began its analysis by noting that the duty of fair representation and the human rights duty to accommodate are related but distinct
duties. It then examined a number of cases, including H(K), which suggested that where a DFR complaint arises from a union’s failure to bring
forward an accommodation grievance, a more searching analysis of the
union’s decision-making is appropriate:
Due to the sensitive and important issues associated with the accommodation of disabled workers in the workplace, labour boards also
look to see whether unions have given disabled employees’ grievances
greater scrutiny. The cases generally concur that the usual procedure
applied to other members of the bargaining unit may be insufficient in
representing a grievor with a disability, mainly because the member’s
situation will require a different approach.40

The union must not, therefore handle a disability grievance in the
“ordinary” manner. “[I]t must be proactive and more attentive in its approach.”41 The CIRB effectively assessed the union’s actions and decisions
on a standard of reasonableness, a standard labour boards have assiduously avoided in applying the DFR more generally.42 So long as the union
was “reasonably careful and reasonably assertive,” the Board stated, it
would not “worry about whether [its] decision not to pursue a grievance
is correct on the language of the collective agreement, or even on the
language of the applicable human rights statute.”43 The CIRB then went
on to list a number of criteria to consider when assessing the DFR in
disability discrimination cases: (a) whether the union’s intervention was
reasonable where the employer failed to implement appropriate accommodation measures; (b) whether the quality of the process that allowed
the union to come to its conclusion was reasonable; (c) whether the union
went beyond its “usual” procedures and applied an extra measure of
40
41
42
43

Ibid at para 64.
Ibid at para 74.
Rayonnier, above note 31.
Bingley, above note 39 at para 83.
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care in representing the employee; and (d) whether the union applied
an extra measure of assertiveness in dealing with the employer. These
criteria seem to combine concern that grievors with both physical and
psychological disabilities might suffer specific difficulties in undertaking
the grievance process itself, and concern about the serious nature of discrimination-related claims. Applying this approach, the CIRB concluded
that the union had not been sufficiently proactive or assertive. Accordingly, it had discriminated against Bingley and thus violated its duty of
fair representation. The CIRB ordered the union to pay the employee’s
costs. It also ordered the parties to attempt to settle the matter, remaining seized if no settlement was reached.
In general, the CIRB attempted to preserve the distinction between
the DFR (over which it has jurisdiction) and the union’s duty to accommodate (over which it does not). However, in discussing the principles applicable to the duty to accommodate, it arguably expanded on the principles
enunciated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Renaud by suggesting
that unions could be directly liable simply for failing to bring forward a
discrimination grievance. As previously noted, the Court in Renaud identified two scenarios in which a union could be liable for discrimination
under human rights codes: where the union has agreed to a discriminatory
practice or where it unreasonably impedes employer accommodation. As
the Court explained, the “union’s responsibility is engaged when it causes
or takes part in the work policy that is the source of the discriminatory
act against the employee, such as a provision contained in the collective
agreement.”44 In Bingley, however, the Board appeared to contemplate a
third scenario in which unions may be liable: “The union’s responsibility
may also be engaged when it does not address the discrimination even
though it did not cause or take part in the discriminatory work policy. . . .
A union may be held responsible for the discriminatory effects of an employment policy decision by not seeking to put an end to the discrimination.”45 This observation was clearly obiter in Bingley, and to date, does not
appear to have been embraced either federally or in any province; indeed,
as discussed below, it has been specifically disavowed in Ontario.46

44
45
46

Renaud, above note 25.
Bingley, above note 39 at para 59, 61.
See the discussion of Gungor v Canadian Auto Workers Local 88, 2011 HRTO 1760
(CanLII) [Gungor], below.
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Bingley has been discussed in a number of DFR cases since it was
issued, but only rarely applied.47 The principles enunciated in Bingley
have received the most thorough treatment in a 2010 decision called
Schwartzmann v Manitoba Government and General Employees’ Union.48
In Schwartzmann, the Manitoba Labour Board expressed approval of the
principles set out in Bingley, and went on to refine them. It linked human
rights issues with the existing DFR jurisprudence regarding “critical job
interests,” and added discrimination disputes to the existing categories of
issues, such as terminations, which deserve special attention because of
their particular significance to employee interests: “[i]n the circumstance
of a disabled employee alleging a violation of statutory anti-discrimination rights, the employment interests are serious and any associated
grievance may have enormous consequences for the employee.”49 Because
human rights issues are critical job interests, the Board held, unions need
to take a more proactive role in assisting employees to understand their
rights and responsibilities, and in obtaining the necessary medical reports,
particularly where their disability makes doing so more difficult.50 On the
facts before it, however, the Board found that the union had met this more
exacting standard, and thus lived up to its duty of fair representation.
Drawing upon the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Parry Sound,
the Commission des Relations du Travail of Quebec has also held that
unions must undertake a more proactive approach in assisting members
with human rights issues in the workplace.51 In Chuuon c Association des
47

48
49
50

51

Oliver and Nape, Re, [2012] LRBD No 10; Schwartzman v Manitoba Government and
General Employees’ Union, [2010] MLBD No 49, 190 CLRBR (2d) 184 [Schwartzman];
Gough v United Steelworkers of America, Local 1976, 2010 CIRB 534, [2010] CIRBD No
39; Pepper v Teamsters, Local 879, 2009 CIRB 453, [2010] CIRBD No 22; Jakutavicius
v Public Service Alliance of Canada, 2005 PSLRB 70; Mallet v Canadian Brotherhood
of Railway, Transport and General Workers, 2014 CIRB 730, 259 CLRBR (2d) 257 [Mallet]; Phillips & Temro Co (Re), [2013] MLBD No 31, 235 CLRBR (2d) 195 [Phillips].
Schwartzman, ibid.
Ibid at para 117.
Ibid at para 119. See also Gendron, above note 27, for a discussion of the role of critical job interests in assessing the union’s DFR; and Banks v Canadian Union of Public
Employees, Local 4828, [2013] SLRBD No 20, where the employee unsuccessfully
argued that harassment (not based on a prohibited ground) constitutes a critical
interest.
Nancy Martel & Pierre E Moreau, Le devoir de juste représentation (Montréal:
LexisNexis Canada, 2009) at 87–88. On January 1, 2016, the Commission des relations du travail of Quebec was renamed the Tribunal administratif du travail.
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employés du Groupe Holiday Inc the Commission held that when a grievance concerns a members’ discrimination claim, the union is obliged to
intervene, to be proactive, to deploy additional efforts and to be particularly sensitive in the manner of representation.52
Ontario, however, has not experimented with a heightened DFR
standard in regards to human rights claims. As Adell noted in 2001, the
Ontario Labour Relations Board issued two decisions around the same
time as H(K) suggesting that unions had a right to be wrong in regards to
discrimination grievances, just as with any other grievance. In Gen-Auto
Shippers the Board held that the union did not violate the DFR when it
refused to grieve the application of a rule that placed workers at the bottom of a seniority list when they temporarily moved job classifications.
The employee in this case had moved to another classification because of
an injury that interfered with his ability to perform the duties of his assigned classification. The Board found that the union was justified in deciding in favour of the interests of the collective that benefited from the
rule, because it was not plainly obvious that the rule violated the Human
Rights Code.53 The Board applied the same reasoning in the same year in
Thunder Bay Hydro, in which it upheld a union’s decision not to challenge
a “last chance” agreement on human rights grounds, again because it was
not clear on its face that the agreement violated the code.54 The issue of
whether or not there is a higher DFR standard in discrimination cases
has not received significant treatment in Ontario since the late 1990s.55
There is therefore some general support for the idea that unions must
be particularly proactive in dealing with members’ disability-related
grievances. Manitoba and Quebec appear to recognize such an obligation,
52

53
54
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2005 QCCRT 115 at para 46. See also Maltais c Section locale 22 du syndicat canadien
des communications, de l’énergie et du papier (SCEP), 2006 QCCRT 316; Syndicat des
fonctionnaires municipaux de Montréal (SCFP) c Commission des relations du travail,
2009 QCCS 4456.
Mason v Gen-Auto Shippers &Teamsters, Local 938, [1999] OLRB 242, [1999] OLRD
No 664 [Mason].
Creed v International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 339, [1999] OLRD No
3422 [Creed].
Both Mason and Creed were recently cited in Sysco Food Services of Toronto, [2016]
OLRD No 465. However, in that case the OLRB concluded that even if a duty to
be proactive applied, the union had met the higher standard applicable in termination scenarios of providing a “persuasive account” of its reasoning, based on
the well-founded nature of the legal opinion and the union’s careful review of the
merits of the case.
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and Bingley has received some positive treatment elsewhere,56 but Ontario has not followed suit. Outside of Quebec, the duty to be proactive,
where it is accepted, is recognized only in disability cases, although some
of its analysis is arguably applicable to other grounds of discrimination.
At a general level, then, a higher standard of investigation may be required in regards to disability discrimination, but no overall change has
otherwise occurred in the DFR caselaw since Weber and Parry Sound in
the standards applied to union handling of human rights issues.

2) Human Rights Claims against Unions before Human Rights Tribunals
The abolition of “gatekeeper” human rights commissions in a number of
provinces since the early 2000s, and the adoption of direct access models,
has opened a wider door to claims made by employees against unions
before human rights tribunals (HRTs).57 In theory, claims of union discrimination could have proceeded through the human rights system prior
to the adoption of direct access models. In practice, however, Commissions typically deferred or dismissed applications from unionized workers, such that very few claims of union discrimination reached human
rights tribunals.58 The implementation of direct access tribunals has thus
increased the possibility of overlapping discrimination claims against a
union, before both a labour board (LRB) and an HRT.
Discrimination claims come before an LRB through a DFR claim
that the union discriminated against the claimant, often in tandem with
additional arguments that the union acted arbitrarily or in bad faith. Because LRB jurisdiction is broader than that of HRTs, there is some scope
for parallel proceedings. Where there is overlap, however, it has typically
been recognized as a zone of concurrent jurisdiction, dealt with through
principles of res judicata and its legislative equivalents.59 LRBs and HRTs
56
57

58
59

See cases above note 47.
In Ontario, British Columbia and Nunavut, claimants may file claims directly with
human rights tribunals. In other jurisdictions, claimants must first bring a claim
to a human rights commission, which usually investigates the matter and decides
whether to bring the claim forward to adjudication before the tribunal. The Commissions in those jurisdictions thus act as gatekeepers.
Etherington, above note 5 at 51–62.
In Ontario the HRTO approaches multiple proceedings through s 45 of the Human
Rights Code, which empowers the Tribunal to defer applications, and s 45.1, which
permits it to dismiss applications where the underlying substance has been appro{ 244 }
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also recognize, however, that each has a core of expertise and often defer
to each other in those areas.
In Gungor, the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) explained
the differences in jurisdiction and role between LRBs and HRTs. LRBs
have “direct and immediate jurisdiction” to assess the adequacy of a
union’s representation regarding member’s potential grievances, including discrimination grievances.60 LRBs rule only on the process of union
conduct and decision-making as regards particular grievances, and can
order that grievances be taken to arbitration for conclusive analysis of
their merits. But they do not rule on the issue of whether union conduct
contravened the human rights code. By contrast, HRTs are capable of
dealing directly with underlying human rights code-related issues raised
by both the conduct of the employer, and by the conduct of the union in
providing or failing to provide representation.61
The Saskatchewan LRB has adopted similar descriptions of its
jurisdiction in comparison with the Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission and Tribunal.62 In Metz the Board identified questions such as
whether the employer’s efforts to accommodate the grievor, and whether the settlement of a grievance complied with the human rights code
as matters within the primary jurisdiction of the Human Rights Commission. The Board retained jurisdiction, however, over the procedural
issues relating to the quality of the union’s representation in dealing with
the accommodation issues.63
priately dealt with by another proceeding. See Jo-Anne Pickel, “Statutory Tribunals
and the Challenges of Managing Parallel Claims,” Chapter 6, this volume. The Tribunal considers DFR proceedings, and the settlement of DFR claims, to be “another
proceeding” for the purposes of s 45.1. See Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H 19, s
45.1; Dunn v Sault Ste Marie (City), 2008 HRTO 149 (CanLII).
60 Gungor, above note 46 at para 53.
61 Ibid at paras 54–55.
62 Although there are numerous DFR cases that refer to parallel human rights claims
by the employee, there are only a few in which the human rights claim is still under
way or has been completed by the time of the DFR hearing, and thus very few in
which the Board needs to undertake a res judicata and/or jurisdictional analysis.
See e.g., O’Flaherty v Vancouver Community College Faculty Association, [2011] BCLRBD No 7, [2011] BCWLD 2372; DM (Re), [2006] SLRBD No 30, 130 CLRBR (2d) 132
[DM]; Metz (Re), [2003] SLRBD No 5 [Metz].
63 Metz, ibid at paras 38–63 The Board followed a similar process in DM, ibid, but
deferred both the substantive and procedural issues to the Tribunal, on the basis
that an evaluation of the union’s processes required a determination as to whether
the employee suffered from a disability and the nature of that disability, which the
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Employees may, of course, opt to by-pass the LRB altogether and bring
a claim regarding discrimination by their union solely to the HRT. There
are two types of human rights claims that can be made against unions.
The first is that the union discriminated against an employee “in employment” (in Ontario, a violation of section 5 of the Code), or “in membership”
(in Ontario, a violation of section 6). In Gungor the HRTO explained that
in claims involving union representation, a union can be found to have
violated section 5 only if the impugned conduct falls within the two scenarios outlined in Renaud.64 In other words, unless a union has participated
in the creation of a discriminatory term in a collective agreement, or has
failed to accommodate by impeding an employer’s legitimate accommodation efforts, its conduct is not governed by section 5. However, claims
that the union has represented a member in a discriminatory fashion may
constitute a violation of section 6, which prohibits discrimination in respect of membership in a trade union.
The HRTO has been very clear, however, that mere failure to bring
forward a grievance is not in itself sufficient to find a violation of the
Code, even where the matter at issue is an allegation of discrimination. To
make out a prima facie case of discrimination, the employee must demonstrate that the union’s decision not to act was at least in part based on
a prohibited ground of discrimination. In Traversy the HRTO put it this
way: “[A] claim that the union violates the Code must be based on an
assertion of differential treatment, and not simply a failure to act. The
failure or refusal to take forward a human rights issue such as accommodation of a disability in the workplace is not, in and of itself, a breach
of the Code. . . .There must be a claim, and a factual foundation for the
claim, that the failure to act was based on discriminatory factors.”65

64

65

Commission was better suited to provide. In DM the Board observed that since the
employee’s complaints were deferred rather than dismissed, the employee could
return to the Board if any of the DFR issues were not addressed by the Commission
(but noted that it may be bound by the Commission’s findings if this occurred). In
Mallet, above note 47, the CIRB similarly deferred a complaint to the Canadian
Human Rights Commission, but re-opened it after the Commission had closed the
file because the applicant did not return calls.
Traversy v Mississauga Professional Firefighters’ Association, 2009 HRTO 996 (CanLII)
[Traversy]. See also Baylet v Universal Workers Union, 2009 HRTO 700 (CanLII); Gungor, above note 46; Holowka v Ontario Nurses Association, 2010 HRTO 2171 (CanLII);
Crosby v United Food and Commercial Workers Canada, 2012 HRTO 1158 (CanLII).
Traversy, ibid at para 33.
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In Gungor the Tribunal was urged to adopt the standards for union
conduct outlined by the CIRB in Bingley. The HRTO emphatically declined to do so. Vice-Chair Mark Hart explained that Bingley concerned
the nature of a union’s representation, not the validity of the underlying
discrimination grievance sought by the employee. Vice-Chair Hart went
further to expressly distance the HRTO from the comments made in
Bingley which suggested that unions may be liable under human rights
codes simply for failure to challenge employer discrimination.66 In his
view, the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Renaud clearly limited a union’s duty to accommodate to situations in which it had participated in the creation of a discriminatory workplace rule or term of the
collective agreement, or impeded the implementation of a reasonable
accommodation; the Court did not hold that unions could be held liable
for failing to take steps to address discrimination in which they did not
participate in one of these ways.
Thus preliminary examination of the caselaw suggests that employees are no more successful before HRTs than they are before LRBs in arguing that their union has discriminated against them. The cases heard by
HRTs are usually simply claims of unfairness in union decision-making,
and do not identify a prohibited ground of decision-making. Accordingly,
they are usually dismissed as being outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.

C. FURTHER EMPIRICAL RESEARCH IS NEEDED
The previous analysis barely scratches the surface of the questions that
arise in considering unions’ representational responsibility for human
rights in the workplace. Although legal principles regarding the DFR (except as regards disability) and unions’ direct liability for discrimination
do not appear to have changed significantly since Weber and Parry Sound,
there is the general sense that unions have become increasingly sensitized to their human rights obligations over the last few decades. How
unions approach their representational responsibilities regarding workplace discrimination, and whether their behaviour has changed since
Weber and Parry Sound, are questions that cannot be answered except by
a series of empirical inquiries which I outline in more detail below.
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Gungor, above note 46.
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1) The Effects of Concurrency
a) Finality
There are two general justifications for the union veto. The first arises
from the union’s position as exclusive bargaining representative. The
veto allows the union control over which issues to negotiate and which
issues to grieve, giving the union authority to make final decisions in
the interest of the collective. It also provides the employer with a single
party capable of making settlements over all workplace disputes, thus allowing the parties to circumscribe the scope of, and bring final resolution
to their differences. One question that therefore arises under a concurrency model is whether, in practice, the concept of finality has become
effectively illusory.
Where multiple tribunals have concurrent jurisdiction, courts must
balance values of finality and fairness. Conflicts between these values
are typically addressed through the doctrines of res judicata and issue estoppel, and/or their statutory counter-parts. 67 The caselaw reveals numerous situations in which a union has brought forward but then settled a
member’s human rights grievance with the employer. The member then
brings both a DFR claim against the union to an LRB, and a human rights
claim against the employer, the union, or both, to an HRT. In other cases,
the union carries the grievance to arbitration, but the affected employee nonetheless brings a simultaneous DFR claim against the union, and
a human rights claim against both the union and the employer, on the
basis of the same or related issues.68 In many DFR cases the employer
is considered an interested party, and may make submissions. Similarly, unions or employers are often invited to make submissions as intervenors in claims at the HRTO in which they have not been named as
respondents. Where a grievance or DFR case is ongoing, the HRTO may
defer the application until the other proceeding is concluded, and vice
versa. However, the existence of concurrent jurisdiction among these tribunals means that the three parties — the employee, the union and the
employer — are forced to deal with a number of different decision-makers over the same series of issues.

67
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See sources above note 18.
See e.g., Ontario Public Service Employees Union v Ontario (Ministry of Community
Safety and Correctional Services) (Therrien Grievance) (2008), 173 LAC (4th) 193
(Arbitrator: Lynk).
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Even though issue estoppel and res judicata principles act to curb
the full re-litigation of a claim before a second decision-maker, all three
parties are often required to make argument in a number of fora. In this
situation, is finality in decision-making still effective? Does it therefore
continue to be a strong justification for the union veto over the filing and
processing of grievances? Do unions benefit, or are they harmed by the
pressures put on them by the union veto in the context of concurrency?
Would unions instead benefit from simply allowing individual employees
to bring forward certain types of grievances to arbitration at their own
cost, as Adell advocated, and let an arbitrator resolve them as between
the employee and the employer? As discussed, employees can often proceed directly to human rights decision-makers where the union refuses
to take forward their discrimination grievance.69 However, in doing so,
they may forego other collective bargaining entitlements. Examining the
parties’ experiences in the federal public sector may be instructive here,
as the Public Sector Labour Relations Act currently permits employees
to bring certain types of grievances forward to arbitration without their
union’s assistance.70 A preliminary review suggests that cases brought
forward by individuals without the support of the union are rarely successful.71 But the success rate may ultimately not be the sole criteria to assess. Individual employees may also derive intangible benefits from being
given the agency to act on their own behalf where the union chooses not
to do so. DFR and human rights claims against the union might thereby
be reduced, with a consequent improvement in feelings of satisfaction
with the union’s representation.
Further empirical research is required in order to determine whether
the potential for harm in depriving unions of control, and introducing
further volatility into relationships with the employer, outweighs the po69
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This is true in most provinces, although Quebec is an exception. See Renée-Claude
Drouin, “Some Unique Features of Weber’s Application in Quebec: The Treatment
of Statutory Labour Rights and Human Rights Claims,” Chapter 9, this volume.
See Public Sector Labour Relations Act, SC 2003, c 22, s 2, s 209 [PSLRA].
Actual tabulation is somewhat difficult because the decisions are not always clear
as to whether the union declined to support the grievance, or whether the employee was not unionized at all. The PSLRA permits non-unionized workers access to
the arbitration process under ss 209(b)–(d). In the federal public sector there is
a standing tribunal that adjudicates grievances, and employees are therefore not
required to pay half of the arbitrator’s fee. In the private sector, a requirement to
contribute to arbitrators’ fees would almost certainly be a significant deterrent to
individual employees proceeding without union support.
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tential benefits achieved by allowing individuals to bring forward grievances on their own. Assessing the potential of such a reform would require
a qualitative study of union, employer and employee experiences to assess
whether and to what extent finality in decision-making has been weakened by concurrency, what impact any potential weakening has on the
parties’ relationships, what benefits might flow to individual employees,
and what effects direct access to arbitration for human rights grievances
might have on the institution of arbitration, and those involved in it.

b) Union Choices Regarding Adjudication Fora
Decisions in human rights cases brought before HRTs by unionized employees against employers sometimes imply that unions have been involved at least in a background capacity. Sometimes the union brings the
claim itself. In other cases it acts as an intervenor on questions related
to the impact of the decision on the rest of the bargaining unit. Union
activity may also be visible in cases where, for example, there is an attempt to split a claim, where the union brings a grievance to arbitration
which does not raise a human rights issue, and the worker then brings a
separate human rights claim to the Tribunal. (At least in Ontario, such
strategies have not been successful.72) But in other cases the union’s role
is less clear, because the decision does not address whether the employee
is proceeding to the Tribunal against the union’s wishes, or with its tacit
and/or financial support.
Another topic for study is therefore the question of when and why
unions might suggest that a member forego arbitration and instead proceed directly to the Tribunal. On what basis would a union decide to take
a claim on a member’s behalf to the Tribunal? Does it do so primarily in
regards to systemic discrimination claims? Do unions simply act as a
facilitating resource? Or do they pay for counsel to represent employees
before the Tribunal? If so, when and how often do they do so? Finally, is
there a difference in the number of claims brought against unions to the
HRTs in direct access-model provinces, as compared to those where commissions play a gatekeeping function?
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Paterno v Salvation Army, 2011 HRTO 2298 (CanLII). See also Shilton, above note 6
at 236.
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2) The DFR
As described above, the predicted heightening of the DFR standard postWeber has occurred only in regard to disability discrimination claims, and
only in some provinces. But questions still remain. Are there more DFR
claims now than prior to Weber? And if so, is any causal relationship discernible between expanded arbitral jurisdiction and a rise in DFR claims?
Even if the legal standards by which union decision-making are judged
have not greatly changed post-Weber and Parry Sound, have unions
changed the ways in which they make decisions about whether to bring
discrimination grievances? Do they, in fact, treat discrimination claims
as critical job interests, and subject them to a more searching analysis
than in other types of claims? Have unions placed a higher standard on
themselves as regards their representational obligations for members’
human rights issues over the years? If they do so now, did they also do so
prior to Weber and Parry Sound? What factors do they consider? And if
they do, how does this affect their ability to balance the individual rights
of members and the collective interests of the bargaining unit?

3) Unions’ Obligations in Intra-member Discrimination Scenarios
Finally, how are unions dealing with their representational responsibilities where the discrimination alleged arises between and among union
members? What do unions do, and what should they do, when one member accuses another of sexual harassment, or racism? These problems
have been under-studied, but pose grave difficulties for unions who are
obliged to represent members with directly conflicting individual interests,73 and sharply highlight the difficulties unions face in determining
what is in the collective interest when significant individual rights issues
are involved.
Here the issue is not the union veto per se; both the “accuser” and the
“accused” may have access to a decision-making forum. The issue is the
nature of the union’s representational obligations during the process of
investigation and any subsequent adjudication. In most cases the accuser will bring a complaint of discrimination by another employee to her
employer (although she may also seek the union’s aid in convincing the
73

Lori Park has written the only study I have located on this issue. See Lori L Park,
“Fair Representation and Conflict of Interest: Sexual Harassment Complaints Between Co-Workers” (1997) 6 Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies 121.
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employer to take appropriate action). Because it is the employer’s legal
responsibility to provide a discrimination-free workplace, the employer
should investigate, and may then take disciplinary action against the accused employee. If disciplinary action is taken, the union must then determine how to apportion its representational duties to both the accuser
and accused. If no disciplinary action is taken, it must then determine
whether it will launch a human rights grievance on behalf of the accuser,
and how it will represent the accused in that scenario.
Practices seem to vary widely among unions and within collective
agreements. Some unions have processes in place to appoint a representative for each employee, with a firewall between the representatives to
ensure confidentiality. In some instances, unions will pay for one party
to secure independent counsel, while directly representing the other.
Other unions have negotiated for the creation of joint union-management investigation processes, in which each party appoints an external
representative to investigate the allegations. In some situations, however,
the union will represent only the disciplined member, on the assumption
that the accuser’s interests are aligned with the employer’s. This last approach has serious pitfalls, since the employer’s interest is ultimately to
avoid liability. Unless specific policies or contract terms so provide, the
employer is not obliged to keep employees informed of more than the
very broad outlines of the progress of the complaint. If the union does not
provide representational services, the employee who has lodged the complaint will have no mechanism to contest the process of the investigation,
and will be beholden solely to the employer for information about who is
appointed to investigate, who is contacted for information, what material
has been provided to the accused, etc. — all information the employer
may not wish to share. She may find therefore find herself effectively in
the dark, as a process unfolds that directly affects her. In addition, given
that discrimination claims are usually brought by members with lesser socioeconomic power — women, racialized workers, sexual minority
employees, etc. — the union may be perceived as disinterested in the experiences of its more vulnerable members, which may in turn give rise to
serious morale issues within the bargaining unit.
Very little research has been done investigating union practices in
intra-member discrimination claims, and these practices are rarely visible in the caselaw. Given the potential difficulties in such cases, however,
further investigation of unions’ experiences with different models would
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be highly instructive in determining what practices are currently used,
and what “best practices” should be promoted and developed.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
This essay has raised questions for further study of the ways in which
unions undertake their representational obligations in regards to human
rights disputes in the workplace since Weber was issued. As the preceding
discussion suggests, the relevant caselaw is not greatly instructive. At a
general level, it arguably establishes a higher standard for applying the
DFR in regards to disability discrimination, but not beyond. And the human rights tribunals have remained faithful to the limited scope of union
liability elaborated in Renaud.
The reported decisions of LRBs and HRTs suggest little reason for
concern that unions are not doing their job in connection with enforcement of employee human rights. Most claims filed against unions appear
unmeritorious. Their facts usually reflect employees who are frustrated
and unhappy with all parties in the workplace, but do not usually reveal any inappropriate action (or inaction) by the union. In these cases,
unions appear to take seriously their obligations to investigate and assess the merits of a grievance, and its effects on the collective. But we
know little about the underlying reasons why the caselaw reflects this
picture. It may simply be that unions have, by and large, internalized and
expanded their human rights obligations and are properly representing
their members as regards workplace discrimination issues. Or it may be
that where a union has acted arbitrarily or discriminatorily in refusing
to bring forward a discrimination grievance, the case settles prior to adjudication, in either forum. Finally, it may also be that unionized workers
who experience inappropriate recalcitrance by their unions in regards to
a discrimination grievance are too powerless or too disillusioned to bring
additional claims.
I suspect all three scenarios have some validity. Most unions are
cognizant of the weight of their obligations in regards to important individual rights held by their members, and have been so at least since
Weber, if not before. Most unions try to balance individual human rights
interests against the needs of the collective. When meritorious claims
arise, it is likely that the parties often settle prior to adjudication, wheth{ 253 }

Claire Mummé

er the claims are framed as DFR claims or human rights claims. But there
are also likely to be some workplaces that continue to be characterized
by a culture of systemic discrimination. We simply do not know from the
caselaw how well employees in those workplaces have been served by
expanded arbitral jurisdiction.
It remains to be assessed, however, whether concurrent jurisdiction
among arbitrators, LRBs and HRTs is the answer. If parallel cases are permitted in multiple forums on essentially the same issue, we need further
empirical study on whether finality continues to have meaning, whether
it continues to have value for workplace parties, and whether it justifies
the union veto. Thus a host of questions remain to be answered to discover
whether and to what extent Weber and Parry Sound have had real impact
on unions’ approaches to their representational obligations regarding
workplace discrimination. If, as the Supreme Court of Canada has noted,
human rights in the workplace are “everybody’s business,” there is still
much we do not know about the effects of Weber and Parry Sound on the
ways in which unions are managing their part of that business.74
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Renaud, above note 25 at para 44. See also Shilton, above note 6 for an analysis of
Renaud and its impact on unions.
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